Intergenerational Justice part 1 - The Environmental and Fiscal Crises

I wanted to share a highly perceptive article by David Runciman on American democracy, in which he talks about intergenerational justice. I say share, I actually want to steal his idea because it's so good I wish I'd thought of it.

Intergenerational justice, in broad terms, is the idea that different generations have obligations towards one another and possess rights over one another that must be respected. Usually we employ this term to denote obligations of the present generation to those who will come after us, but its reach is much broader. It can also apply to the obligations of older people to younger people, and of the living to the dead. So, for example, when Helen Lovejoy of  The Simpsons cries "won't somebody please think of the children," she is actually expressing her endorsement of intergenerational rights.

One of the most influential thinkers in the history of intergenerational justice, though he never directly employs the term, is Edmund Burke. In his Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke defines society as

"a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born."

Today, this version of the social contract still forms the bedrock of a great deal of conservative thought, and explains to a large extent the right's interest in tradition and pastoral care of the local environment. But that is not to say that Burke's contract is the exclusive preserve of the right. His definition is sufficiently flexible to appeal to all sides of the political spectrum. A recent report making the case for constitutional protection of future generations was submitted to the House of Commons by Rupert Read, a left-winger and former Green Party candidate.

However, as Runciman's article makes clear, the ways in which both right and left employ intergenerational justice can vary hugely, neatly illustrating the partisan nature of politics both in the UK and especially in the US. When it comes to the environment, for example, the left generally employs intergenerational justice as a tool to encourage the present generation to limit CO2 emissions and leave future generations in a better position to combat climate change. The right, in contrast, tends to either dismiss this obligation or to question its preeminence. When it comes to the fiscal crisis these positions are reversed. Now, we generally find the right emphasising the need to reduce our debts so we do not force future generations to pay for our profligacy, whilst the left take a more relaxed view, arguing that seeking to address debt by slashing spending is unnecessary, or at least not our most pressing priority.

Runciman's analysis emphatically demonstrates the difficulty of applying intergenerational justice to real world political situations. Not only do we have to decide what obligations we owe to different generations, we also have to convince others of the value of our decisions. The wide endorsement of Burke's definition of intergenerational justice demonstrates that it is easy for most to accept that different generations have rights over one another, but the nature of western democracy is such that we rarely agree what these rights are, and how and when they should be protected.