Politicians, climate policy and cognitive dissonance

I think I've made it pretty clear where I stand on the subject of climate change denial, but to a certain extent, I've grown to admire the commitment of deniers to their ignorance. Despite having been consistently shown to be fools lacking basic scientific knowledge or human empathy, deniers tend to show an awful lot of resilience. Either they've simply given up on rational thought, or they've realised that if they cave now they'd have to own up to being massive tools. Whatever it is, like a stubborn stain in a toilet bowl, they won't disappear easily.

What is perhaps more pressing, at least in a political sense, is the stance of those who have accepted the facts of global warming but have so far failed to act with anything like the speed required. Obviously, certain aspects of climate policy are notoriously difficult to articulate because of uncertainties, but the urgency with which we must proceed is not in doubt. Action and clear targets need to be enforced now. Investment and commitment is a must.

I recently read an interview with Jon Huntsman in which he perfectly articulated everything I find distasteful about this wishy-washy approach to climate questions, so I thought I would use this opportunity to make a few points. For those of you who do not know him, Huntsman is seemingly one of the few rational human beings still part of the Republican Party in the US. Prior to his decision to run for the GOP nomination, a rather doomed enterprise considering his rather centrist views, Huntsman had accepted the qualified opinion of the scientific community on the question of anthropogenic climate change to the extent that he famously tweeted towards the start of the race: "To be clear. I believe in evolution and trust scientists on global warming. Call me crazy."

Sadly, the initial optimism surrounding Huntsman's faith in science was dashed last December when he parroted the denialist line that "the scientific community owes us more in terms of a better description or explanation." Because of this, he continued, there is simply "not enough info right now to be able to formulate policies."

Obviously, Huntsman was always going to be playing to a hostile crowd on the subject of environmentalism, but it was nonetheless disheartening to be confronted with a GOP race in which none of the candidates were prepared to act on decades of qualified research.

When asked recently by Grist about his apparent volte-face Huntsman maintained his position, arguing that "there is confusion in the minds of a lot of Americans about where the science is because the debate is still going on in the scientific community." Without "consistent and scientifically backed data," he insists, "you can't get good public policy." 

This could be taken straight out of a denialist handbook. Right from the get-go climate scientists have been adamant about the absolute necessity of curbing CO2 emissions. For more than two decades now, the IPCC has insisted on the vital importance of acting sooner rather than later. Lyndon Johnson even addressed congress on the subject back in 1965. There is still confusion in the science, but only in the particulars. By calling for further research, delay, and 'clarity,' you are simply inviting catastrophe. The solid facts of man-made global warming have been known about for a very long time, and Huntsman's failure to acknowledge this speaks volumes about his priorities.

These priorities become more clear later in the interview when Huntsman notes that "the problem [of climate change] has become eclipsed by the jobs deficit right now...There ain't a whole lot of bandwidth for anything else." Climate change is simply "taking a backseat to some of these other more urgent issues that are economics related. I'm not following the issue like I was several years ago." Most tellingly, he claims, "people aren't going to hear out the scientific community until such time as the economy rebounds."

Personally I find it hard to conceive of anything more urgent that combating the greatest environmental threat that mankind has ever faced, but Huntsman's rhetoric is simply indicative of the position of many politicians on both sides of the barricade. A fallacy has emerged, suggesting that we have to make a choice between economic recovery and jobs or a clean energy future. Not only does this position eschew the reality of job creation in the low carbon sector, it fails to account for the absolutely enormous potential of a switch to green energy. Not just in jobs, but in terms of growth as well. Technological innovation through research and development could well spark the industries of the future, and there are clear indications that renewables are growing ever more competitive on an economic level. The furore over the British government's decision to cut solar FITs is, in this respect, something of a promising development. In addition, failure to act now could result in gigantic costs further down the line. Economic transformation is simply not something that might happen, it's something that has to happen unless we want to embrace economic ruin in the long term.

Which neatly points us to another wholly distasteful element of modern politics that is totally at odds with climate reality: ferociously aggressive short-termism. When GDP is all that matters, and political careers rest on its fluctuations, it becomes incredibly difficult to persuade public figures of the necessity of revolutionising entire economies. When the immediate consequences of emissions are hidden by lags, moreover, this task becomes ever more challenging.

Although not a problem of Huntsman's making, short-termism is an issue which we need to deal with and one which politicians needs to discuss openly. There are signs that this conversation is beginning. In the UK, for example, Rupert Read has suggested the creation of a third house of 'Guardians' that would monitor and vet legislation to ensure that it does not adversely affect the generations that will come after us. Cross-party agreement on long-term goals and policy is, in my opinion, a necessity, unless we want to continue to see our interest in the environment vary along with the stock market.

Moreover, the most frustrating element of Huntsman's position is his apparent unwillingness to account for market failure. Pure and simple, environmental decimation brought about through man-made warming is the unseen or ignored consequence of industrialised capitalism. Had environmental factors been costed properly in the first place, it seems highly unlikely that we would find ourselves in such a precarious position. To continue to ignore this market failure, and prioritise fossil fuels in the immediate future, is sheer lunacy. It is the decision to abandon the real world for a fantasy universe in which the laws of physics do not apply. Markets must be logically bound by the parameters of the world in which they exist, so to suggest that the environment can take a backseat to economic development is frankly absurd. Economic development should not and can not be divorced from environmental well-being. Reality has to frame economic development, not the other way around, and until politicians realise this the real world will continue to suffer.

Mitigation vs. Adaptation: Why we can't afford to wait and see

One of the major difficulties facing anyone trying to articulate climate policy is dealing with uncertainty. I should stress to all you sceptics out there that I do not mean uncertainty surrounding the scientific fundamentals - we know that global warming is happening, and that mankind's activities are the cause of it - but rather how quickly or severely climate change will affect us (though early indications present a very bleak picture indeed).

This uncertainty arises in part from the lags associated with CO2 emissions. Estimates suggest that we may face a 40 year delay before the true warming effect of green house gas emissions begins to be felt. At the moment, we are only experiencing warming from 1960s emissions. For this reason, it may be tempting to look at a lack of immediate cause and effect as a demonstration of uncertainty within the science itself, leading one to the assumption that more investigation and more time might be needed to properly evaluate the potential risks. Moreover, there is a vocal minority, perhaps susceptible to this view, that would go so far as to suggest that we are capable of adapting to any change that does present itself. This is a profound mistake.

The difficulty with the wait and see approach extends directly from the fact that it refuses to acknowledge the reality of the cause until it accounts for its effect, but, as I just mentioned, by the time this effect makes itself known it may well be too late to stop some of its worst consequences. Even if we stopped emitting now, we still face the possibility of a temperature increase between 1C and 3C above pre-industrial levels. If we continue to emit whilst waiting for further evidence to present itself, we will likely reach temperatures even higher than this. We know more than enough to suggest that the risk of inaction is far too high.

When you combine the wait and see approach with a focus on adaptation, the problem is amplified. To argue the case for adaptation you would probably need to demonstrate that the risks of waiting are relatively slight, and, given the evidence at our disposal, this is a very difficult claim to maintain under scrutiny. On the other hand, if you acknowledge the risks, you then have to claim that we would be able to adapt to the changes that significantly higher temperatures could bring. This is also extremely difficult.

If we pursued a business-as-usual approach CO2e concentrations would likely reach about 750ppm by the end of this century. This entails about a 50% chance of a mean global temperature increase of 5C. The potential devestation unleashed by such a rapid surge in temperature is biblical in proportion. At that temperature, most, if not all, of the ice and snow in the world would melt causing the seas to rise exponentially. Bangladesh and Florida would be submerged, along with numerous islands and coastal regions, Souther Europe would become a desert, and agricultural land the world over would be redrawn requiring a radical alteration of food systems. The nation of Kiribati in the Pacific ocean is currently in talks with the Fijian government to relocate its entire population due to rising sea levels. Kiribati has a population of 100,000, Bangladesh alone has a population close to 150 million. It seems arrogant to imagine that human ingenuity would be able to deal safely with the kind of migration and famine that dramatic warming could entail.

Perhaps what troubles me most about the adaptation argument is that it seems to appeal to pride; a sort of humans vs. nature scenario in which we pit human technology against natural forces in the belief that we can successfully overcome whatever challenges the earth throws at us. This is never a battle we are likely to win, and succesfully warding off global warming will require more than a degree of humility, as well as an acknowledgement that we cannot hope to outsmart natural forces at this level of intensity.

Mitigation not only makes sense environmentally, it also makes sense economically. The scale of investment required to mitigate climate change is significant, but it is well within our capability. Nicholas Stern suggests that we require investment of around 2% of GDP annually to limit our temperature increase to around 2C, a moderate amount compared to the possible costs entailed by the consequences of inaction. James Hansen suggests a very different approach, calling for a carbon tax on fossil fuels which would be redistributed amongst populations without any interference from government. Though these suggestions come from very different ends of the political spectrum, they are united by an acknowledgement that immediate action must be taken to counteract potentially monstrous costs further down the line.

Whichever way you look at it, barring a remarkable scientific or technological discovery, mitigation, pursued swiftly and emphatically, seems to be the only sensible option. Those who place their faith in adaptation simply fail to appreciate the degree of danger with which we are confronted. Unless we face up to our responsibility to future generations, we may well leave them with a planet devoid of the environmental and economic riches we take for granted.

Poverty, Green Growth, and the New Industrial Revolution

Last week I went to a series of lectures by Professor Nicholas Stern, author of the hugely influential 2006 Stern Review. For those of you familiar with the contents of the original study, these talks did not necessarily provide much novelty, but, as an overview of the economic and political ramifications of climate change, the message dispensed through them is vital and important. I'd heartily recommend that you all take a little time out to review the slides and listen to the podcasts here, here, here, and here.

Stern is certainly an eloquent speaker and his ability to transcend the worlds of academia and public policy is particularly impressive. His appeal for a new industrial revolution to combat climate change risks is sensible, and, more importantly, achievable. The difficulty lies, as he makes clear, in galvanising the political will to take definitive action against the hazards of global temperature increases.

I won't go into too much detail on the contents of the talks because his podcasts will undoubtedly do the topic more justice, and his forthcoming book sounds like a must-read for anyone with an interest in the economics of climate change. I will, however, highlight just a few of the points that most appealed to me, partly because they help to validate much of my own thinking, and partly because his central arguments have such far-reaching consequences for international development.

The most vital sentiment I took away from these lectures was the idea that there simply cannot be any passengers in this battle. To keep to a roughly 50/50 chance of a 2C rise in temperatures, world emissions need to be cut by a factor of 2.5, which is equivalent to lowering emission flows from nearly 50 billion tonnes in 2010 to less than 20 in 2050. If we account for a conservative growth in output of a factor of 3 over this time, then we need to cut our emissions to output ratio by a factor of at least 7. In case anyone was in any doubt about the scope of change needed, these figures should leave you under no illusion. We are talking about making industry between 7 and 8 times more environmentally efficient by 2050. That is a huge task.

It is largely these figures that explain the title of this lecture series, 'Climate Change and the New Industrial Revolution,' because the scale of the changes required necessitate no less than a complete reappraisal of business practice in general. Little good comes of targeting specific industries or sectors (though obviously larger efficiency savings in some areas can help mitigate more sluggish change in others). We must instead revolutionise the way in which the whole of our world economy is run. From the largest fossil fuel emitters right down to the average household, we all need to live much more efficiently.

Stern is also keen to demonstrate the important link between combating poverty and combating climate change, describing this story as one of "deep injustice." One of the most distressing features of global warming is that those peoples that played historically little part in fossil fuel emissions will be those that are hit earliest and hardest by rising temperatures and sea levels. Because of this injustice, reasons Stern, we cannot insist upon treating the small remaining carbon space that we have as a commons. The fossil fuel reserves that we can still safely use should be focused on helping developing and undeveloped countries to grow and build their own sustainable futures. The rich countries were the ones that reaped the whirlwind, and it is the rich countries that must take the lead in correcting their failure. 

Not only does this make sense economically, it is a moral imperative. If we picture reserves as currency, it would take a hard heart to claim that a poor man and a rich man alike should both be given an equal amount of cash. It is far more just and equitable to prioritise the needs of the poor man, over those of the already rich. By allowing poor countries to develop quickly, whilst rich countries lead the way in technological innovation, we can hope to overcome the two greatest challenges of our age, poverty and climate change. Who knows, in 200 years time people might look back on this period as a turning point for the better in human history.

Beyond these two core arguments, Stern also provides a refreshingly sober analysis of the role of the state in tackling AGW. As I have mentioned in previous blogs, the argument, or supposed argument, between the private and public sector has taken on such a toxic quality that we have reached the point where some on the right perceive any State intervention, no matter how slight, as a gross violation of liberty. Stern gives this view short shrift. The argument, he maintains, that the markets should be free to navigate themselves out of this mess does not take account of the fact that it was market failure that caused it. By utterly failing to properly cost the environmental damage produced by fossil fuel driven growth, markets have locked us into a road to ruin. Even the most fervent free-market economist recognises that in an instance of market failure, the State needs to intervene to provide direction. Indeed, many see this as the State's key, and perhaps sole, responsibility to the economy.

The tone of Stern's first two lectures was largely optimistic, in spite of the scope of the challenge he presents. He makes it clear that we are pretty much aware of what has to be done, we are pretty sure of the amount of investment required (roughly 2% of annual GDP), and we are already seeing rapid technological innovation. What we are clearly lacking, as he discussed in the third, is the political will to enact these necessary changes. The reason for this becomes obvious by a simple comparison. If we look at the British economy during the Second World War, people were united in their recognition of the need to combat the threat of fascism in Europe. There was no objection when the economy was transformed into a centralised war machine. Today, in contrast, it is very difficult for a public, who are not necessarily familiar with the science, who are preoccupied with a fiscal crisis, and who are regularly subject to denialist drivel, to perceive the dangers and risks of climate change, that, no matter how real, seem distant and opaque. When we think of these things, our current lack of political will becomes increasingly understandable.

This, then, is our major task. We simply must get better at communicating these risks and making them more relevant to the person on the street. We have the knowledge, we have the ability, we have the money and the expertise; all that is lacking is the will power. It is one thing to know that we can do something, but quite another to know that we will do it.